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Abstract. One of the most celebrated results in mechanism design is Myerson’s characterization of the
revenue optimal auction for selling a single item. However, this result relies heavily on the assumption
that buyers are indifferent to risk. In this paper we investigate the case where the buyers are risk-loving,
i.e. they prefer gambling to being rewarded deterministically. We use the standard model for risk from
expected utility theory, where risk-loving behavior is represented by a convex utility function.
We focus our attention on the special case of exponential utility functions. We characterize the optimal
auction and show that randomization can be used to extract more revenue than when buyers are risk-
neutral. Most importantly, we show that the optimal auction is simple: the optimal revenue can be
extracted using a randomized take-it-or-leave-it price for a single buyer and using a loser-pay auction,
a variant of the all-pay auction, for multiple buyers. Finally, we show that these results no longer hold
for convex utility functions beyond exponential.
1 Introduction
The classic mechanism design problem, pioneered by Myerson’s seminal work [Myerson, 1981],
considers designing an auction that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue. There is rich literature
on this mechanism design problem under different settings. However, most prior work assumes the
buyers are utility maximizers with quasilinear utility functions, where the utility function is linear
in either the payment or the buyer’s value. These assumptions often make the problem simple
and easy to analyze. In the real world, agents need not follow such assumptions. In fact, under
different behavioral models for the buyers, the auctioneer is able to draw more revenue than under
the standard setting, where the buyers are maximizing their linear utility functions. One particular
example is when the buyers are risk-averse [Maskin and Riley, 1984, Chawla et al., 2018]. In this
case, the seller/auctioneer can design an “insurance”-based auction to extract more revenue from
risk-averse buyers. In this paper, we study the setting where the buyers are risk-loving. We ask
whether the auctioneer can take advantage of such risk-loving behavior, and if so, what can be
achieved?
Recently, experiments in electricity markets and transportation networks have demonstrated
the importance of designing a mechanism for risk-loving agents. Electric utility companies are con-
sidering how to incentivize customers to reduce their electricity consumption in peak load times so
as to alleviate the strain on the grid and to prevent expensive line capacity and transformer up-
grades. Some of the more successful attempts to achieve a desired “demand response” have included
offering lottery coupons to consumers for scaling back demand [Li et al., 2015]. In transportation
networks, similar lottery schemes have been applied to reduce congestion in the rush hour [Lu,
2015, Pluntke and Prabhakar, 2013, Merugu et al., 2009]. In both cases, more consumer response
was elicited from lotteries, where a consumer was offered a small chance to win a big reward, than
from small fixed payments. Hence, there is a need for a theoretical foundation and analysis of the
optimal lottery schemes to improve the consumer response and experience in these nation critical
infrastructure applications.
In economics, von Neumann-Morgenstern’s expected utility theory [Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1945] has been a standard model to describe people’s preferences. According to this theory, an agent
evaluates the payoff of an event by applying a utility function on the wealth it generates, and takes
the expectation over all possible events to evaluate the payoff of a given action. As such, expected
utility theory provides a simple way to describe how people behave when facing risk — a risk-averse
player has a concave utility function, whereas a risk-loving player has a convex utility function. Con-
sider a payment scheme where a buyer can choose one of two payment options. In the first option,
the buyer either pays $100 or $0, each with probability 50%. In the second option, she has to pay
$50 with certainty. These two options have the same expected gains. A risk-neutral buyer, who has
a linear utility function, is indifferent between these two options. A risk-averse buyer is going to
choose the second option because she prefers the less risky payment scheme. A risk-loving buyer
will choose the first option because she is more willing to take risks.
In the above example, the expected payment the seller receives is $50. If the buyer is risk-
loving, we can extract more revenue by replacing the first option with an even more risky payment
option. For example, we can offer another payment option in which the buyer pays $110 or 0, each
with probability 50%. From the risk-loving buyer’s perspective, this new payment option is still
preferable to the second option. Therefore, the expected payment the seller receives will increase to
$55. In fact, it has been shown by Hinnosaar [2017] that in the absence of any regulation, the seller
is able to extract infinite expected revenue from a risk-loving buyer by simply taking advantage of
this trick — offering a menu option that asks the buyer to pay a very high amount with a very
small probability. Therefore, in this paper, we will mainly focus on the bounded transfer setting,
i.e. where we upper bound the ex-post payment that the seller may ask the buyer to pay. In other
words, the amount of payment by the buyer is upper-bounded by some specific value under all
circumstances. Particlarly, the bounded transfer requirement can be shown to be equivalent to the
buyers having a publicly known really high yet still bounded budget.
1.1 Our results and Techniques
In this paper, we focus on a special case of risk-loving agents, that use an exponential utility func-
tion of the form u(x) = β(eαx−1). We seek to design individually rational and incentive compatible
mechanisms that maximize the revenue. We assume bounded transfers, that is the maximum pay-
ment of the mechanism is bounded, and characterize the optimal mechanism. Surprisingly, we show
that if the value distribution of the agents is well behaved, then the optimal revenue can be ex-
tracted using a randomized take-it-or-leave-it price for a single buyer and a loser-pay auction, a
variant of the all-pay auction where the winner gets a refund, for multiple buyers.
Our analysis combines a generalized virtual value function similarly to Myerson’s analysis [Myerson,
1981] and the duality framework developed by Cai et al. [2016]. In particular, we upper bound the
revenue of the optimal mechanism by defining a dual solution that can be interpreted as a general-
ization of the virtual value function. Then we show that this solution matches the revenue obtained
by a randomized-take-it-or-leave-it price and the loser-pay auction, for a single buyer and for mul-
tiple buyers, respectively. To our surprise, the virtual value function that captures the marginal
revenue is different in the single buyer and multiple buyer settings, which may be explained due to
the additional uncertainty introduced by the extra buyers.
These results are in stark contrast with the risk-averse setting where the seller can improve the
revenue by offering a plethora of lotteries each with a deterministic price but different allocation
probabilities [Maskin and Riley, 1984]. The risk-averse buyer opts to pay for lotteries that are
priced close to her value and the risk is used as a deterrent for under-bidding. On the other hand,
we can extract more revenue from a risk-loving buyer by randomizing the payment. This is because
the buyer gains more utility from gambles so that we can increase the probability that the price
is accepted. This difference in how risk behavior is exploited explains the conceptually different
nature of revenue maximizing mechanisms in the two settings.
2 Related Work
Most work on optimal mechanism design beyond the risk-neutral setting has focused on risk-
averse preferences. The classic results of Maskin and Riley [1984] and Matthews [1983] provide a
characterization of the optimal mechanism with concave utility functions. A recent result in this
area by Dughmi and Peres [2012] is that any mechanism designed for risk-neutral buyers can be
adjusted to also align the incentives of risk-averse buyers and obtain similar guarantees. Fu et al.
[2013] consider the design of prior-independent mechanisms (that have no access to the buyers’
private value distributions) for risk-averse buyers. Finally, Chawla et al. [2018] study the design of
robust mechanisms under the cumulative prospect theory model.
To the best our knowledge, the only work on mechanism design under risk-loving behavior is
by Hinnosaar [2017], who shows that in the absence of regulations, the seller can extract infinite
revenue from the buyer with asymptotically risk-loving behavior under both the expected utility
theory and prospect theory models.
Recently, the duality theory framework has drawn attention in the mechanism design commu-
nity for understanding optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. For example, Daskalakis et al.
[2017, 2013] and Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias [2014, 2015] discovered the connection between
the dual problem and the optimal transport (bipartite matching) problem. Cai et al. [2016] con-
sider a duality framework via linear programming, and identify a connection between the virtual
valuations and the dual variables. In our setting, the problem results in a different form of dual
problem than in the multi-item setting, hence we seek to establish a new duality framework that
diverges from the multi-item setting to different behavior models.
3 Problem Statement
We study revenue maximization for a single seller and n symmetric buyers. The seller has a single
item to sell and each buyer i has a private value ti for the item. We use t = (t1, . . . , tn) to denote
the values of all buyers. We let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vK} denote the set of all possible values, which is
shared by all buyers. For simplicity, we assume v1 = 0 and v1 < v2 < · · · < vK . Additionally, we
assume each buyer’s private value is drawn independently from a known identical distribution with
probability mass function f . Without loss of generality, we assume f(v) > 0 for all v ∈ V . Further,
we let P = {z1, z2, . . . , zM} denote the set of allowed payments, where z1 = 0 (no positive transfers)
and z1 < z2 < · · · < zM . Here we implicitly assume that P is upper-bounded by zM
1. This implies
that our setting becomes equivalent with the case where the payments are unconstrainted but the
buyer has a publicly known budget of zM as we show in subsection 3.2. We additionally require
that zM > vK , that is, the upper bound of the payment is larger than the largest possible buyer’s
value.
Each buyer seeks to maximize her utility given by a function u : R → R, which we assume is
strictly increasing and u(0) = 0. If u is linear, then we say the buyers are risk-neutral and if u is
convex, then we say that the buyers are risk-loving. For the rest of the paper, we focus on a special
case of convex utility, specifically the exponential utility function given by u(x) = β(eαx − 1) for
some α > 0 and β > 0. Unless otherwise noted, we will assume such an exponential utility function
for the buyers.
Notation. Let [R] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , R}, for any positive integer R. For any vector v,
we use v−i to denote the vector generated by removing the i-th coordinate from v. Also, we use
(v,v−i) to denote the vector generated by replacing the i-th coordinate of v with v.
1 Without this assumption, it can be shown that there exists a mechanism that attains infinite revenue from risk-
loving buyers Hinnosaar [2017].
3.1 Direct Mechanisms and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
In a direct mechanism the auctioneer elicits bids from each buyer and then decides on their allocation
probabilities and payments. We represent such a mechanism by Md = (X,P ), where X : V
n →
{0, 1}n is a random allocation function and P : V n → Pn is a payment function which can also be
randomized. Given all buyers’ values t = (t1, . . . , tn), we refer to the random variable (X(t),P (t))
as the outcome of the mechanism at t.
We require that our mechanism Md is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC), that is, for each
buyer, it is in her best interest to truthfully report her value in expectation. Note that this ex-
pectation takes into account the randomness of the mechanism as well as the uncertainty about
the other buyers’ values. Formally, Md = (X,P ) is BIC if for any i ∈ [n] and for any v ∈ V and
v′ ∈ V , it holds that
E[u(vX(v, t−i)− P (v, t−i))] ≥ E[u(vX(v
′, t−i)− P (v
′, t−i))], (1)
where the expectation is taken over X, P , and t−i. A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if it
guarantees a non-negative expected utility for every buyer that truthfully reveals her value, i.e, for
any i ∈ [n] and for any v ∈ V , it holds that
E[u(vX(v, t−i)− P (v, t−i))] ≥ 0. (2)
Note that if we only allow non-negative payments, then we must have P (0, t−i) ≤ 0 almost surely.
3.2 Bounded transfers and budgeted buyers
As we stated in the beginning of Seciton 3 we require the mechanism to charge ex-post payments
from a finite pool of P, where zM is the largest ex-post price that also satisfies that zM > vK , i.e.,
the upper-bound on the payment is larger than the highest value of the buyer. The finiteness of
zM can be thought of as buyers having a finite budget equal to zM . Particulalry, for the case where
P was unbounded but the buyers had a budget of zM then no reveue maximizing IR mechanism
would ever charge an ex-post price larger than zM . Similarly, in any feasible mechanism under the
bounded-transfer setting, the buyers with budget greater than the upper-bound on the ex-post price
behave as if they had no budget at all. As a result, in both of those cases the revenue-maximizing
BIC and IR mechanism are the same.
3.3 Myerson’s Mechanism and Virtual Values
One of the fundamental results of auction theory is Myerson’s characterization of revenue optimal
mechanisms for risk-neutral buyers [Myerson, 1981]. This is achieved by an ammortized analysis
that expresses the revenue of any mechanism via the virtual value function φ(v), which captures the
marginal revenue of allocating to a buyer with value v. The virtual value function is defined for a
continuous distribution of values (and can be similarly defined for a discrete one), with cumulative
distribution function F and probability density function f , as
φ(v) = v −
1− F (v)
f(v)
. (3)
The revenue of the mechanism equals the expected virtual surplus, i.e., the expected virtual value of
the winner. As a result, if the value distributions satisfy certain properties, the optimal mechanism
turns out to be quite simple: for a single buyer it is just a take-it-or-leave-it price and for multiple
symmetric buyers it is the second price auction with a common reserve. However, this definition
of virtual values heavily relies on the risk-neutrality assumption. Our analysis generalizes this
definition for risk-loving buyers in Definition 2 in order to derive our results.
3.4 Revenue Maximization as an Optimization Problem
Our goal is to characterize the optimal mechanism for revenue maximization. To that end, we
model the mechanism design question as an optimization problem. We define the decision variables
{y0i,j, y
1
i,j}i∈[n],j∈[M ], where y
0
i,j : V
n → [0, 1] and y1i,j : V
n → [0, 1], that encode the mechanism Md
as follows: y0i,j(t) represents the probability that buyer i does not get the item and pays zj when
the buyers’ values are t. Similarly, y1i,j(t) represents the probability that buyer i gets the item and
pays zj, given the buyers’ values are t.
Those decision variables capture both the allocation and the payment of the mechanism given
any reported values. To see this, the allocation probability that buyer i gets the item given values
t is
∑
j y
1
i,j(t) and the expectation of her randomized payment is
∑
j zjy
1
i,j(t) +
∑
j zjy
0
i,j(t) where
the first and second summand correspond to her expected payment if she wins or loses the item
respectively.
For the sake of succinctness of our optimization problem formulation, we further define the
interim version of the decision variables y1i,j(t), y
0
i,j(t), denoted by y
1
i,j(vk), y
0
i,j(vk). Namely, given
that the buyer has value vk, what is the expected probability of winning/losing the item and paying
value zj in expectation over the values of the other buyers v−i? These interim variables are given
by:
y1i,j(vk) =
∑
v−i∈V n−1
y1i,j(vk,v−i)f(v−i), y
0
i,j(vk) =
∑
v−i∈V n−1
y0i,j(vk,v−i)f(v−i). (4)
We can express the interim allocation xi(k) of buyer i at value vk as xi(k) =
∑
j y
1
i,j(vk) and
her interim payments in case of win pi(k) and loss qi(k) as:
pi(k) =
∑
j zjy
1
i,j(vk)
xi(k)
, qi(k) =
∑
j zjy
0
i,j(vk)
1− xi(k)
.
The above follow from the definition of conditional probability. With this notation, we can rewrite
the BIC constraint as:∑
j
[
y1i,j(vk)u(vk − zj) + y
0
i,j(vk)u(−zj)
]
≥
∑
j
[
y1i,j(vk′)u(vk − zj) + y
0
i,j(vk′)u(−zj)
]
,∀k, k′ ∈ [K],
(5)
where the first and second summand on the left hand side correspond to the expected utility if buyer
i wins and loses, respectively, after truthfully reporting vk. Similarly, the first and second summand
on the right hand side correspond to the expected utility if buyer i wins and loses, respectively,
after misreporting vk′ .
In addition, we can write the IR constraint as∑
j
[
y1i,j(vk)u(vk − zj) + y
0
i,j(vk)u(−zj)
]
≥ 0, ∀k ∈ [K]. (6)
Finally, we need to satisfy the feasibility constraints
∑
j
(
y0i,j(v) + y
1
i,j(v)
)
= 1,
∑
i
∑
j
y1i,j(v) ≤ 1, ∀v ∈ V
n. (7)
Therefore, we can find the optimal mechanism by solving the following linear program:
Maximize
∑
i
∑
v∈V
f(v)
∑
j
zj
[
y0i,j(v) + y
1
i,j(v)
]
(8)
Subject to Constraints (4), (5), (6), and (7).
y0i,j(v) ≥ 0, y
1
i,j(v) ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V
n.
3.5 Overview of Main Theorems and Results
The main result of this paper is that there is no need to actually solve the linear program (8) in order
to compute the optimal mechanism. Instead, we take advantage of the linear program formulation
(8) of the problem to help us derive simple mechanisms that are optimal. In particular, when
there is a single risk-loving buyer with an exponential utility function, we show that the optimal
mechanism is a randomized “take-it-or-leave-it” price, which offers the buyer a single randomized
price irrespectively of her value. We present this result in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Restatement of Theorem 5). Consider a single risk-loving buyer with exponential
utility. The optimal mechanism is the revenue maximizing randomized take-it-or-leave-it price.
When there are multiple symmetric risk-loving buyers, we show that the optimal mechanism is
a loser-pay auction with a reserve price. In a loser-pay auction, the item is awarded to the buyer
with the highest value but only the buyers who do not get the item are paying. Similarly to the
single buyer case, all payments are randomized between the minimum and the maximum price. We
will show the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Restatement of Theorem 7). Consider n ≥ 2 risk-loving buyers with exponential
utility u(x) = β(eαx − 1). Assume zM ≫ α. Then, the optimal mechanism is a loser-pay auction.
4 Optimal Mechanism Design for a Single Buyer
In this section, we characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism for selling an item to a single
risk-loving agent. Specifically, we show that the optimal mechanism is a randomized “take-it-or-
leave-it” price, that offers the buyer a single randomized price irrespectively of her value. To prove
that, we first characterize the revenue generated by the optimal randomized take-it-or-leave-it price.
Then, we prove that this mechanism remains optimal if we allow an arbitrary BIC mechanism, by
utilizing the optimization problem formulation and the duality framework to find a matching upper
bound. Note that this result is quite similar to what the Myerson characterization implies for the
single risk-neutral buyer setting with the exception that the optimal “take-it-or-leave-it” price is
always deterministic. However, as Example 1 demonstrates, this is no longer true for the risk-loving
setting, and randomizing the price is required even in the case where the allocation probability is
deterministic.
For the rest of this section, we are going to use the following menu of options interpretation that
provides an equivalent description of BIC mechanisms in the single buyer case: A menu consists of a
tuple (Xi,Pi) where Xi and Pi represent the allocation and payment random variables. Instead of
the buyer revealing her value, the seller offers the buyer a collection of menu options and the buyer
chooses the menu option that maximizes her utility. For example, a deterministic take-it-or-leave-it
price can be described with the menu options (0, 0), (1,P ) where P is a point-mass at some price
p.
4.1 Sub-optimality of Deterministic “Take-it-or-leave-it” Prices
We illustrate that randomizing a take-it-or-leave-it price can result in increased revenue as the
buyer shifts from a risk-neutral to a risk-loving utility function. For the sake of the presentation we
use a continuous distribution but similar results can be derived using a discrete value distribution.
Example 1. Assume the buyer’s value t for the item is distributed according to the Uniform dis-
tribution U(0, 1). Then, the optimal mechanism with a risk-neutral buyer is to offer the buyer a
take-it-or-leave it price of 1/2, producing a revenue of 1/4. Now, consider the case of a risk-loving
buyer with utility u. Her utility of accepting this price is u(t−1/2). Now, consider a different scheme
using a randomized take-it-or-leave-it price: with probability 1/2 pay nothing and with probability
1/2 pay 1. Note that this scheme has the same expected payment as the first one. However, the
expected utility of the buyer for this option is 12u (t) +
1
2u (t− 1) and by Jensen’s inequality, we
get that 12u (t) +
1
2u (t− 1) > u
(
t− 12
)
, which indicates that the expected utility function for the
randomized menu option is always above the utility function of the menu option (1, 1/2). This
means that the probability that a buyer accepts the randomized menu option is greater than 1/2,
i.e. Pr[12u(t) +
1
2u(t− 1) ≥ 0] ≥ Pr[u(t− 1/2) ≥ 0] = 1/2. Therefore, offering the randomized menu
option earns more revenue.
4.2 Optimal Take-it-or-leave-it Randomized Price
In Example 1, we saw that randomizing the take-it-or-leave-it price increased the revenue extracted
by a risk-loving buyer. This gives rise to the question: What is the revenue maximizing randomized
take-it-or-leave-it price?
Definition 1. A randomized take-it-or-leave-it price with allocation and price P is a mechanism
that contains only two menu options (0, 0) and (1,P ).
In a randomized take-it-or-leave-it price scheme, the seller posts a (possibly randomized) price P
of the item, and asks the buyer to accept it or not. If the buyer rejects the price, then her allocation
is zero and she pays nothing. According to Myerson [1981], we know that with a risk-neutral buyer,
it is optimal to post P with the expectation of P equal to argmaxv(v Pr[t ≥ v]). In contrast, for a
risk-loving buyer we show that P must be randomized and specifically have positive support only
for the maximum and minimum allowable price. Formally, we state this in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. With a risk-loving buyer, the randomized take-it-or-leave-it price with following ran-
domized payment rule
P =
{
zM , w.p.
u(v∗)
u(v∗)−u(v∗−zM )
0, otherwise
where v∗ = argmaxv∈V
zM Pr[t≥v]u(v)
u(v)−u(v−zM )
, is the optimal randomized take-it-or-leave-it price. The opti-
mal take-it-or-leave-it price has revenue maxv∈V
zM Pr[t≥v]u(v)
u(v)−u(v−zM )
.
Note that for a linear utility function u this implements the optimal deterministic take-it-or-
leave-it price for a risk neutral agent and produces the exact same revenue. We call the optimal
take-it-or-leave-it mechanism the revenue maximizing randomized take-it-or-leave-it price.
Theorem 3 can be proved in two steps. In the first step, we apply Jensen’s inequality to show
that given any pricing rule P , we can construct another pricing rule P ′ that randomizes between
0 and zM , and achieves a larger utility than P for any value v ∈ V . In the second step, we use the
individual rationality constraint to derive the optimal pricing. Due to space constraints, we defer
the full proof to Appendix A.1.
4.3 Duality Theory for Optimal Mechanisms
In this section, we prove our main theorem (Theorem 4), namely that the revenue-maximizing take-
it-or-leave-it randomized price is optimal among all possible mechanisms for revenue extraction.
This is similar in nature to the risk-neutral setting where Myerson [1981] showed that a take-it-
or-leave-it payment is optimal. It is important to note that the same is not true for the case of
risk-averse agents where multiple menu options can be used to extract revenue that approaches the
social welfare given sufficient aversion to risk.
We prove this theorem by upper bounding the revenue of the optimal mechanism using the
optimization problem formulation (8) and employing the duality framework. Specifically, we identify
dual variables of the Lagrangian dual program and show that it matches the maximum revenue
obtained by a take-it-or-leave-it randomized price. The core idea is to define a virtual value function
that captures the marginal revenue and assume a regularity condition to close the duality gap. The
virtual values used in interpreting Myerson’s result heavily rely on the assumption of risk neutrality,
therefore we need a new definition of virtual value.
Definition 2 (Virtual value function for a single buyer). In the single buyer setting, the
virtual value function φu : [K]→ R with respect to utility function u is defined as
φu(k) =
1
f(vk)
∑
k′≥k
f(vk′) ·
u(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
k′≥k+1
f(vk′) ·
u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
 .
Note that this definition of the virtual value function reduces to Myerson’s virtual value function
for linear u. To see how this new definition of virtual value function is related to the marginal
revenue, consider a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism with a pricing rule that asks the buyer to pay
zM with probability p, and pay zero otherwise. If we would like to guarantee that this pricing rule
is accepted by a buyer with value greater than v, then by individual rationality, we can find that
the largest p, the probability of paying zM , we can set is
u(v)
u(v)−u(v−zM )
. Therefore, the expected
revenue we have from this mechanism is
∑
v′≥v f(v
′)zM
u(v)
u(v)−u(v−zM )
. As a result, we can find that
f(vk)φu(k)zM is indeed the marginal increase on the revenue by moving the threshold value from
vk+1 to vk. Given the definition of the virtual value function above, we need to define the following
regularity condition:
Definition 3 (Regular distribution for a single buyer). In the single buyer setting, a distri-
bution f is regular if the corresponding virtual value function is monotone increasing, i.e. for any
k, k′ ∈ [K] and k > k′, it holds that φu(k) > φu(k
′).
Note that with this regularity condition, in the optimal take-it-or-leave-it mechanism considered
in Theorem 3, the optimal quantile can also be found by looking at the smallest k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,K}
such that φu(k) > 0. We are now ready to state our first main result in Theorem 4, which says that
the revenue maximizing randomized take-it-or-leave-it price that we derived in Theorem 3 is the
optimal mechanism for a single buyer, assuming the regularity condition. Due to space constraints,
we will only give a proof sketch that demonstrates our duality framework, and we defer the full
proof to Appendix A.2.
Theorem 4. Consider a single risk-loving buyer with exponential utility whose value is drawn
from a regular distribution f . Then, the optimal mechanism is the revenue maximizing randomized
take-it-or-leave-it price.
In order to prove this theorem, first note that the revenue of the optimal mechanism is upper-
bounded by the Lagrangian dual program of the linear program (8). For the single buyer case the
dual program of (8) can be simplified as
Minimize
∑
k∈[K]
νk (9)
Subject to the following constraints:
f(vk)zj +
∑
k′
(λkk′u(vk − zj)− λk′ku(vk′ − zj)) + µku(vk − zj) ≤ νk, ∀k ∈ [K], j ∈ [M ]
f(vk)zj +
∑
k′
(λkk′ − λk′k) u(−zj) + µku(−zj) ≤ νk, ∀k ∈ [K], j ∈ [M ]
µk ≥ 0, λkk′ ≥ 0, ∀k, k
′ ∈ [K],
where λkk′ corresponds to the BIC constraints (5), µk corresponds to the IR constraints (6), and
νk corresponds to the feasibility constraints (7). For the first two sets of the constraints in program
(9), we define
Γk(z;λ, µ) = f(vk)z +
∑
k′
(λkk′u(vk − z)− λk′ku(vk′ − z)) + µku(vk − z)
Πk(z;λ, µ) = f(vk)z +
∑
k′
(λkk′ − λk′k)u(−z) + µku(−z).
In the dual program (9), the constraint Γk(z;λ, µ) ≤ νk corresponds to the variable y
1
1,j(vk) in
the primal (8) and the constraint Πk(z;λ, µ) ≤ νk corresponds to the variable y
0
1,j(vk). In fact,
for any k ∈ [K], we can show that among the sets of constraints {Γk(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νk}j∈[M ] and
{Πk(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νk}j∈[M ], only the following four can be binding: Γk(0;λ, µ) ≤ νk, Γk(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ νk,
Πk(0;λ, µ) ≤ νk, and Πk(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ νk. This can be observed by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. In the dual program (9), both Γk(z;λ, µ) and Πk(z;λ, µ) are either increasing or strongly
convex in z for z ≥ 0.
The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix A.2. Now, we are ready to demonstrate how
we can construct a set of dual variables that helps prove our main theorem in the following proof
sketch. Due to space constraints, the full calculation can be found in Appendix A.2.
Proof (Proof sketch of Theorem 4). To prove the theorem, we construct a set of feasible dual
variables that upper bound the value of the dual program (9) by the revenue of the optimal take-
it-or-leave-it randomized price. For any k, k′ ∈ [K], we set µk = 0 and
λkk′ =
{∑
ℓ≥k f(vℓ)zM
1
u(vk)−u(vk−zM )
, if k′ = k − 1
0, otherwise.
(10)
For simplicity, we define k∗ = min{k : φu(k) > 0}. For any k ∈ [K], we set
νk = max {0, f(vk)φu(k)zM} .
Under this choice of νk, given the regularity condition, we can write the objective of the dual
program (9) as ∑
k
νk =
∑
k:φu(k)>0
f(vk)φu(k)zM =
∑
k≥k∗
f(vk)φu(k)zM .
Then, by the definition of the virtual value function, we have
∑
k
νk =
∑
k≥k∗
( ∑
k′≥k f(vk′)u(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
k′≥k+1 f(vk′)u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
)
zM
=
∑
k≥k∗
f(vk)zM ·
u(vk∗)
u(vk∗)− u(vk∗ − zM )
, (11)
where the last equality results from taking a telescopic sum. We can find that the expression in the
last line (11) is equal to the revenue of the optimal take-it-or-leave-it mechanism.
It remains to verify that this choice of the dual variables is feasible for the dual program (9). Since
we have argued that the sets of constraints {Γk(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νk}j∈[M ] and {Πk(z;λ, µ) ≤ νk}j∈[M ] can
only be binding at j = 0 and j =M , it suffices to check whether Γk(0;λ, ν) ≤ νk, Γk(zM ;λ, ν) ≤ νk,
Πk(0;λ, ν) ≤ νk, and Πk(zM ;λ, ν) ≤ νk. We defer the detailed derivation to the full proof in
Appendix A.2. Here, we only show that by bringing our choice of the dual variables into these
constraints, we have
Γk(0;λ, µ) = f(vk)φu(k)zM , Γk(zM ;λ, µ) = f(vk)φu(k)zM ,
Πk(0;λ, µ) = 0, Πk(zM ;λ, µ) = (1 − e
−αzM )f(vk)φu(k)zM .
By definition of νk, we can find that this assignment of dual variables is feasible. Therefore, weak
duality implies that the objective value of program (8) is upper bounded by the revenue maximizing
take-it-or-leave-it randomized price, which shows that this mechanism is optimal.
In addition, we can find that given k ∈ [K], as long as φu(k) > 0, the only binding dual
constraints are Γk(0;λ, µ) ≤ νk and Γk(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ νk. Therefore, by complementary slackness, in
the optimal mechanism, the pricing scheme must be a randomization of 0 and zM , and must ask the
buyer to pay only if she is given the item. This coincides with the revenue-maximizing randomized
take-it-or-leave-it price, which is our claimed optimal primal solution.
4.4 Optimal Mechanism beyond Regularity Condition
In the next step, we would like to extend our duality framework described in Theorem 4 to the
case without a regularity condition. Namely, we would like to prove that the revenue-maximizing
take-it-or-leave-it randomized price is still optimal even though the virtual value function is not
an increasing function, using the similar argument that we have made in Section 4.3. Formally, we
would like to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Consider a single risk-loving buyer with exponential utility. The optimal mechanism
is the revenue-maximizing randomized take-it-or-leave-it price.
The technique that we use to prove this theorem consists of two steps. First, we construct an ironed
virtual value φ˜u. The ironed virtual value function is an increasing function constructed based on
the original virtual value function, which is similar to the risk-neutral case as in Myerson’s work.
After that, we can slightly modify the dual variables that we specified in Section 4.3 to match the
ironed virtual value and then claim the optimality of the revenue-maximizing randomized take-it-
or-leave-it price by strong duality.
Surprisingly, having a non-linear utility function does not complexify the ironing process. We
can directly apply Myerson’s ironing for a risk-loving buyer by convexifying the cumulative virtual
value function. Formally, we can define the “ironed virtual value” function in the following way:
Definition 4 (Ironed virtual value for a single buyer). Given a virtual value function φu.
Let {[a1, b1], [a2, b2], . . . , [am, bm]} denote the intervals that are not convex on the cumulative virtual
value function Fφ(k) =
∑
ℓ≤k φu(ℓ). Then, the ironed virtual value function is defined as
φ˜u(k) =

∑bi
ℓ=ai
f(vℓ)φu(ℓ)
∑bi
ℓ=ai
f(vℓ)
, if k ∈ [ai, bi], for any i ∈ [m]
φu(ℓ), otherwise.
Although the ironing process is straightforward, how to modify the dual variables to match the
ironed virtual value is more tricky. Recall that under the choice of λ as specified in (10), the left
hand side of the first dual constraint is upper-bounded by the virtual value, i.e. Γk(0;λ, µ) =
Γk(zM ;λ, µ) = f(vk)φu(k)zM . Motivated by Cai et al. [2016], we show that we can add loops to
λ to alter the value of Γk.
2 More precisely, consider some k′ < k. If we add Ae−αvk to λk,k′
and add Ae−αvk′ to λk′,k for some A > 0, then Γk(0;λ, µ) is increased by A[e
−αvk′ − e−αvk ] and
Γk′(0;λ, µ) is decreased byA[e
−αvk′−e−αvk ]. This distorted modification guarantees that the binding
structure does not change, i.e. Γk(0;λ, µ) = Γk(zM ;λ, µ) and Γk′(0;λ, µ) = Γk′(zM ;λ, µ). With this
idea, we are able to apply Myerson’s ironing by iterative adding loops to λ in the way such that
Γk(0;λ, µ) = f(vk)φ˜u(k)zM holds after the modification. After that, we are able to follow the steps
in the proof of Theorem 1 to prove the theorem. Due to the space constraint, we defer the detailed
proof of Theorem 5 to Appendix A.3.
5 Optimal Mechanism Design with Multiple Symmetric Buyers
In this section, we extend our analysis of optimal mechanism design to multiple symmetric buyers
(n ≥ 2). Since the buyers are symmetric, their values come from the same distribution and they
have the same utility function. We show that the loser-pay auction achieves the maximum revenue
in the multiple-buyer case. In a loser-pay auction, the buyer with the highest value wins the item
and only the buyers that do not obtain the item pay. In addition, similarly to the randomized take-
it-or-leave-it pricing, all payments are made using a mixing of the minimum and the maximum
price. This auction could be thought of as implementing an incentive-compatible version of the
all-pay auction but adjusting it to achieve maximum discrepancy between the two outcomes.
When characterizing the revenue maximizing mechanisms, our analysis is similar to the analysis
in Section 4.3 in that it uses the virtual value formulation and the duality framework to upper bound
the revenue obtained by the optimal mechanism. In what follows, we first give an example of the
loser-pay auction and show how it improves the revenue compared to the second price auction,
which is optimal for risk-neutral buyers.
5.1 An Example
Example 2. Consider two buyers. Assume the private values of both buyers are distributed in-
dependently according to the uniform distribution U({0, 1}), and u(x) = eαx − 1. Also assume
3(eαx − 1) < 1− e−αzM . Consider the following mechanism:
1. The item is allocated to the buyer who reports the higher value. If both buyers report 1, the
item is allocated uniformly at random. If both buyers report 0, the item is not allocated to
anyone.
2 In Cai et al. [2016], the dual variables can be interpreted as flows. However, in our setting, this interpretation no
longer holds. We need to handle the distortion caused by the non-linear utility function.
2. If a buyer reports 1, she gets the item and does not pay anything. However, if she reports 1 and
she does not get the item, then she pays zM with probability
3(eα−1)
1−e−αzM
.
To verify this mechanism is BIC and IR, we check the utility curve if a buyer reports 1 to the seller.
Consider buyer 1. Given her true value is t1, her expected utility is
x1(2)u(t1) + (1− x1(2))
3(eα − 1)
1 − e−αzM
u(−zM ) =
3
4
(
eαt1 − 1
)
−
3
4
(eα − 1),
which is 0 if t1 = 1 and −
3
4(e
α−1) if t1 = 0. This verifies that the mechanism is BIC and IR. Next,
we can find that the revenue of this mechanism is
Rev =
∑
i∈{1,2}
Pr[ti = 1](1 − xi(2))
3(eα − 1)
1 − e−αzM
zM =
3
4
eα − 1
1− e−αzM
zM .
From the above example, we make two observations. First, we find that compared with the case
of a single buyer, the revenue is increased by a factor of 32e
α. Note that in the case of risk-neutral
buyers, this factor is only 32 . The additional factor of e
α comes from the second observation — the
buyer pays if she does not get the item. In the rest of this section, we show that these two properties
hold in the optimal mechanism.
5.2 The Loser-pay Auction
Recall that in the setting with risk-neutral buyers, the second-price auction with reserve price is
optimal. A natural question here is, when the buyers are risk-loving, does the optimal mechanism
take a similar form? We show that, given the assumption that zM ≫ α, i.e., the maximum allowed
price is far greater than the level of risk-loving, the optimal mechanism corresponds to the revenue
maximizing loser-pay auction. From Example 2, we already know that the optimal payment rule is
to ask the buyer who loses to pay a randomized price. The reserve price in our risk-loving setting,
similarly to the risk-neutral setting, is going to be computed via a virtual value function.
We have already defined a virtual value function for the convex utility function in Section 4.3.
However, recall that the virtual value function is the marginal revenue in the quantile space. Ac-
cording to Example 2, there is an additional eα factor in the revenue of the multi-buyer setting,
hence now we need a different definition of the virtual value function than in the single buyer case.
Specifically, in the multi-buyer setting, we need to consider the following new virtual value function
that takes this eα factor into account:
Definition 5 (Virtual value function for multiple buyers). In the multi-buyer case, the
virtual value function Φu : [K]→ R with respect to an exponential utility function u is defined as
Φu(k) =
1
f(vk)
∑
k′≥k
f(vk′) ·
eαvku(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
k′≥k+1
f(vk′) ·
eαvk+1u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
 .
In Section 5.3, we will show that this additional eα factor comes from the competition that only
happens when there are multiple buyers. Similar to the single buyer case, we call a distribution f a
regular distribution if its corresponding virtual value function is a monotone increasing function. If
f is not regular, then we can apply Myerson’s ironing to the new virtual value function as what we
have described in Section 4.4. We let Φ˜u denote the ironed virtual value of Φu. The formal definition
of Φ˜u can be found in Appendix B.3.
Now, we are ready to describe the loser-pay auction — the mechanism that we claim to be
optimal when the buyers are risk-loving:
Definition 6 (The loser-pay auction). A loser-pay auction is a direct mechanism with the
following allocation and payment rule:
1. Suppose each buyer i bids vki . Then, the auctioneer allocates the item to buyer i if Φ˜u(ki) >
Φ˜u(ki′) for every other buyer i
′ 6= i provided Φ˜u(ki) > 0.
2. Suppose each buyer i bids vki. If buyer i submits the bid with the largest ironed virtual value and
ties with nt − 1 other buyers, then she gets the item with probability 1/nt provided Φ˜u(ki) > 0.
3. If buyer i bids vk and gets the item, she pays nothing.
4. If buyer i bids vk with Φ˜u(k) ≤ 0, she pays nothing, i.e. qi(k) = 0.
5. If buyer i bids vk with Φ˜u(k) > 0 and does not get the item, then she pays zM with probability
qi(k) =
1
1− xi(k)
k∑
k′=k∗
[xi(k
′)− xi(k
′ − 1)]u(vk′)
−u(−zM )
,
where k∗ = min{k ∈ [K] : Φu(k) > 0} is the index of the reserve price.
For simplicity, in this section, we use k = (k1, . . . , kn) to denote the indices of bids from all buyers.
Also, we use f(k) =
∏
i∈[n] f(vki) to denote the probability that t = (vk1 , vk2 , . . . , vkn). If buyer i
submits her bid vk that is no less than the reserve price vk∗ , then the interim probability that she
gets the item is
xi(k) =
∑
k−i∈[K]n−1
f(k−i)
1
{
Φ˜(vki) ≥ Φ˜(vki′ ),∀i
′ 6= i
}
∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
Φ˜(vki) = Φ˜(vki′ )
}
 ,
where 1{A} is the indicator function that equals 1 if event A is true, and 0 otherwise. In order to
guarantee that the payment rule of the loser-pay auction is feasible, we need to make the following
assumption, which plays an important role in guaranteeing qi(k) < 1:
(A1) zM ≫ α so that for each v ∈ V , it holds that
1− 1
n
f(v)
1
n
f(v)
· (eαv − 1) < 1− e−αzM .
We show that the loser-pay auction is feasible, individually rational, and Bayesian incentive
compatible under Assumption (A1). Due to space constraints, we defer the proof of the following
theorem to Appendix B.1.
Theorem 6. Consider n ≥ 2 buyers with exponential utility. With Assumption (A1), the loser-pay
auction is feasible, individually rational, and Bayesian incentive compatible.
5.3 Duality Theory for Optimal Mechanism Design
We now show that the loser-pay auction is an optimal mechanism. Formally, we will show the
following theorem, which is our main result when we have n ≥ 2 risk-loving buyers:
Theorem 7. Consider n ≥ 2 buyers with exponential utility. With Assumption (A1), the loser-pay
auction is the optimal mechanism.
The core idea behind the proof of Theorem 7 is similar to Theorem 4. First, we write down
the dual program of the linear program (8). Then, we construct a set of feasible dual variables and
show that under this assignment, the dual objective is equal to the revenue of the loser-pay auction.
Then, by strong duality of linear programming, we conclude that the revenue maximizing loser-pay
auction is optimal. When we have n ≥ 2 symmetric buyers, the dual program of the linear program
(8) can be derived to be:
Minimize
∑
k∈[K]n
∑
i∈[n]
νi,k + γk
 (12)
Subject to the following constraints:
f(k−i)Γi,ki(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νi,k + γk, ∀i ∈ [n],∀k ∈ [K]
n, j ∈ [M ]
f(k−i)Πi,ki(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νi,k, ∀i ∈ [n],∀k ∈ [K]
n, j ∈ [M ]
µk ≥ 0, λi,ki,k′i ≥ 0, γk ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n],∀k ∈ [K]
n,
where
Γi,k(z;λ, µ) = f(vk)z +
∑
k′
(
λi,k,k′u(vk − z)− λi,k′,ku(vk′ − z)
)
+ µi,ku(vk − z)
Πi,k(z;λ, µ) = f(vk)z +
∑
k′
(
λi,k,k′ − λi,k′,k
)
u(−z) + µi,ku(−z).
In the dual program (12), the dual variable λi,k,k′ corresponds to the BIC constraint (5) for buyer
i, and the dual variable µi,k corresponds to the IR constraints (6) for buyer i. Differently from
the single buyer case in program (9), for the feasibility constraints (7), we have the dual variable
νi,k associated with each buyer, and γk associated with the single-item constraint. Also, the con-
straint f(k−i)Γi,ki(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νi,k + γk corresponds to the primal variable y
1
i,j(vk1 , . . . , vkn) and the
constraint f(k−i)Πi,ki(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νi,k corresponds to the primal variable y
0
i,j(vk1 , . . . , vkn).
Similarly to Lemma 1, we show in Lemma 6 in the appendix that both Γi,k(z;λ, µ) and
Πi,k(z;λ, µ) are either increasing or strongly convex in z. This means that the first two sets of
constraints in (12) can only be binding at either end points j = 1 or j =M .
If f is a regular distribution, then we can use the following assignment to prove the strong
duality: For each buyer i ∈ [n] and any k, k′ ∈ [K], we set µi,k = 0 and
λi,k,k′ =
{∑
ℓ≥k f(vℓ)zM
eαvk
u(vk)−u(vk−zM )
, if k′ = k − 1
0, otherwise.
(13)
For each buyer i ∈ [n] and any k ∈ [K]n, we also set νi,k = 0 and γk = maxi∈[n] {0, f(k)Φu(ki)zM}.
Under this assignment, we have f(k−i)Πi,ki(0;λ, µ) = f(k−i)Πi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) = 0 and
f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ, µ) = f(k)Φu(ki)zM , f(k−i)Γi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) = f(k)Φu(ki)zMe
−αzM .
Differently from the assignment (10) that we made in the single buyer case, the binding structure
changes here because of the additional γk in the first dual constraint from the single item constraint.
For k > k∗, the dual constraints no longer bind at Γi,k(0;λ, µ) and Γi,k(zM ;λ, µ) but at Γi,k(0;λ, µ)
and Πi,k(zM ;λ, µ). The additional e
α factor in (13) ensures this new binding pattern.
If f is not a regular distribution, we can add loops to λ as we have done in Section 4.4 for
the single buyer case. Due to the space constraint, we defer the full discussion with the regularity
condition to Appendix B.2 and the discussion without regularity condition to Appendix B.3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the revenue-maxizining mechanism for the special case of risk-loving agents
with exponential utility functions. We demonstrate that for both a single and multiple symmetric
buyers the optimal auction is simple. A natural question is whether or not the same results extend
beyond the expoential utility function. Unfortunately, it can be shown that optimal auction for
the case of a single agent with quadratic utility function is more complicated than the simple
randomized take-it-or-leave it offer and requires us to utilize at least one more menu option as
shown in Appendix C.
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7 Appendix
A Missing Proofs from Optimal Mechanism Design for a Single Buyer
A.1 Optimal Take-it-or-leave-it Randomized Price
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). Consider the menu option (1,P ) with E[P ] = p. Suppose P is not
randomized only at 0 and zM . We will show that we can flip one more coin to construct a new
randomized payment P ′ with only 0 and zM and obtain potentially more revenue. Conditioned on
P , we set P ′ = zM with probability P /zM , and set P
′ = 0 otherwise. Then, we can find that given
the buyer’s value is v, the expected utility of choosing (1,P ′) is
E[u(v − P ′)] = E[(P /zM )u(v − zM ) + (1− P /zM )u(v)]
≥ E[u((P /zM )(v − zM ) + (1− P /zM )v)] = E[u(v − P )]
where the inequality comes from Jensen’s inequality. This means that for any value, the expected
utility curve of (1,P ′) is no less than (1,P ). Let t0 denote the intersection of E[u(x−P )] and the
x-axis, i.e. let t0 be such that
E[u(t0 − P )] = 0.
Similarly, let t′0 denote the intersection of E[u(x− P
′)] and the x-axis, i.e.
E[u(t′0 − P
′)] = 0.
We can find that since E[u(x−P ′)] is above E[u(x−P )], and both functions are monotone increasing,
we have t′0 ≤ t0. This implies that the revenue using a randomized take-it-or-leave-it price can be
achieved by randomizing only between 0 and zM .
As a result, given the expectation of a randomized payment, we can without loss of generality
consider its implementation that randomizes over the extremes as follows: with probability p/zM
charge zM and with the remaining probability charge 0. To find the probability that such a menu
is accepted, we solve for the threshold value t′ that is indifferent between accepting and rejecting:
(p/zM )u(t
′ − zM ) + (1− p/zM )u(t
′) = 0.
Solving for p, we can find that p = zMu(t
′)
u(t′)−u(t′−zM )
. Since the probability of a buyer choosing this
menu option is Pr[t ≥ t′], we can conclude that the revenue is zM Pr[t≥t
′]u(t′)
u(t′)−u(t′−zM )
.
A.2 Duality Theory for Optimal Mechanisms
First, we show that in the dual program (9), for any k ∈ [K], among the sets of constraints
{Γk(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νk}j∈[M ] and {Πk(zj ;λ, µ) ≤ νk}j∈[M ], only the following four can be binding:
1. Γk(0;λ, µ) ≤ νk
2. Γk(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ νk
3. Πk(0;λ, µ) ≤ νk
4. Πk(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ νk
This can be observed by noticing that both Γk and Πk are either increasing or strongly convex in
z for z ≥ 0, which we prove in the following lemma (restatement of Lemma 1):
Lemma 2. In the dual program (9), both Γk(z;λ, µ) and Πk(z;λ, µ) are either increasing or strongly
convex in z for z ≥ 0.
Proof. To show this, we can simply rewrite Γk(z;λ, µ) in the following way
Γk(z;λ, µ) = f(vk)z +
∑
k′
(
λkk′β(e
α(vk−z) − 1)− λk′kβ(e
α(vk′−z) − 1)
)
+ µkβ(e
α(vk−z) − 1)
= f(vk)z + β
[∑
k′
(λkk′e
αvk − λk′ke
αvk′ ) e−αz + µke
αvke−αz −
∑
k′
(λkk′ − λk′k)− µk
]
= f(vk)z + βBke
−αz − βAk, (14)
where
Ak =
∑
k′
(λkk′ − λk′k) + µk
Bk =
∑
k′
(λkk′e
αvk − λk′ke
αvk′ ) + µke
αvk .
We can find that if Bk > 0, then Γk(z;λ, µ) is strongly convex in z whereas if Bk ≤ 0, then
Γk(z;λ, µ) is monotone increasing in z. Similarly, for Πk(z;λ, µ), we have
Πk(z;λ, µ) = f(vk)z +
∑
k′
(λkk′ − λk′k)β(e
−αz − 1) + µkβ(e
−αz − 1)
= f(vk)z + βAke
−αz − βAk, (15)
Also, we can find that if Ak > 0, then Πk(z;λ, µ) is strongly convex in z whereas if Ak ≤ 0, then
Πk(z;λ, µ) is monotone increasing in z.
Now, we are ready to prove the main theorem.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). To prove the theorem, we construct a set of feasible dual variables
that upper bound the value of the dual program (9) by the revenue of the optimal take-it-or-leave-it
randomized price.
For any k, k′ ∈ [K], we set µk = 0 and
λkk′ =
{∑
ℓ≥k f(vℓ)zM
1
u(vk)−u(vk−zM )
, if k′ = k − 1
0, otherwise.
For simplicity, we define k∗ = min{k : φu(k) > 0}. For any k ∈ [K], we set
νk = max {0, f(vk)φu(k)zM} .
Note that under this choice of νk, the objective of the dual program (9) becomes∑
k
νk =
∑
k:φu(k)>0
f(vk)φu(k)zM
=
∑
k≥k∗
f(vk)φu(k)zM
=
∑
k≥k∗
( ∑
k′≥k f(vk′)u(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
k′≥k+1 f(vk′)u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
)
zM
=
∑
k≥k∗
f(vk)zM ·
u(vk∗)
u(vk∗)− u(vk∗ − zM )
, (16)
where the second equality follows from the regularity condition, and the last equality results from
taking a telescopic sum. We can find that (16) is equal to the revenue of the optimal take-it-or-
leave-it mechanism.
It remains to verify that this choice of the dual variables is feasible for the dual program (9). By
Lemma 1, it suffices to check whether Γk(0;λ, µ) ≤ νk, Γk(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ νk, and Πk(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ νk.
First, we check:
Γk(0;λ, µ) = λk,k−1u(vk)− λk+1,ku(vk+1)
=
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
u(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
= f(vk)φu(k)zM ≤ νk
and
Γk(zM ;λ, µ) = f(vk)zM + λk,k−1u(vk − zM )− λk+1,ku(vk+1 − zM )
= f(vk)zM +
∑
ℓ≥k f(vℓ)zMu(vk − zM )
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1 f(vℓ)zMu(vk+1 − zM )
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
=
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vk)zM
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vk)zM
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
+
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
u(vk − zM )
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
u(vk+1 − zM )
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
=
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
u(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
= f(vk)φu(k)zM ≤ νk.
For Πk(zM ;λ, µ), we note that
f(vk)φu(k)zM =
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
u(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
=
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
1− e−αvk
1− e−αzM
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
1− e−αvk+1
1− e−αzM
=
f(vk)
1− e−αzM
+
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
e−αvk+1
1− e−αzM
−
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
e−αvk
1− e−αzM
.
Then,
Πk(zM ;λ, µ) = f(vk)zM + λk,k−1u(−zM )− λk+1,ku(−zM )
= f(vk)zM +
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
u(−zM )
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
u(−zM )
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
= f(vk)zM −
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zMe
−αvk +
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zMe
−αvk+1
= (1− e−αzM )f(vk)φu(k)zM ≤ νk.
Therefore, the choice of the dual variables is feasible. Weak duality implies that the objective value
of (8) is upper bounded by the revenue maximizing randomized take-it-or-leave-it price, which
shows that the revenue maximizing randomized take-it-or-leave-it price is optimal.
A.3 Optimal Mechanism beyond Regularity Condition
As we have mentioned in Section 4.4, the main intuition behind the proof of Theorem 5 is that
we can construct an ironed virtual value φ˜u. Then, we can slightly modify the dual variables that
we specified in Section 4.3 to match the ironed virtual value. More specifically, consider the dual
program (9) and suppose we have a new set of dual variables (λ˜, µ˜, ν˜). We would like to show that
1. ν˜k = max{0, f(vk)φ˜uzM}, which relates the dual variables with the ironed virtual value.
2.
∑
k ν˜k = maxk∈[K]
[∑
ℓ≥k f(vℓ)zM
u(vk)
u(vk)−u(vk−zM )
]
, which shows the strong duality with the
revenue-maximizing take-it-or-leave-it randomized price.
The ironing argument that we are going to make in this section is motivated by Cai et al. [2016].
However, since in the risk-loving setting, we can no longer interpret the dual variables as “flows”
as Cai et al. [2016] have done in the risk-neutral setting, the challenge here is to identify how to
carefully take care of the distortion caused by a non-linear utility function when adding a loop to
the dual variables.
Before we give a formal proof of Theorem 5, let us give some intuition that leads to the ironing
process. Consider the dual variables λ′. Suppose λ′ coincides with λ except at k = k0 and k = k1
for some k1 < k0:
λ′k0,k1 = λk0,k1 +
∑
ℓ≥k0
AzM
1
u(vk0)− u(vk0 − zM )
(17)
λ′k1,k0 = λk1,k0 +
∑
ℓ≥k0
AzM
1
u(vk1)− u(vk1 − zM )
(18)
for some A > 0. Comparing this with the definition of λ in (10), here we are introducing an
additional loop of amount A between k0 and k1. Note that this particular way of adding the loop
ensures Γk(0;λ
′, µ) = Γk(zM ;λ
′, µ) and Πk(zM ;λ
′, µ) = (1 − e−αzM )Γk(0;λ
′, µ) for any k ∈ [K].
Then, we can find that at k = k0, we have
Γk0(0;λ
′, µ) = Γk0(0;λ, µ) +
∑
ℓ≥k0
AzM
[
u(vk0)
u(vk0)− u(vk0 − zM )
−
u(vk1)
u(vk1)− u(vk1 − zM )
]
= Γk0(0;λ, µ) + (K − k0 + 1)AzM
[
e−αvk1 − e−αvk0
1− e−αzM
]
> Γk0(0;λ, µ).
Similarly, at k1, we have
Γk1(0;λ
′, µ) = Γk1(0;λ, µ) +
∑
ℓ≥k0
AzM
[
−
u(vk0)
u(vk0)− u(vk0 − zM )
+
u(vk1)
u(vk1)− u(vk1 − zM )
]
= Γk1(0;λ, µ) + (K − k0 + 1)AzM
[
e−αvk0 − e−αvk1
1− e−αzM
]
< Γk1(0;λ, µ).
We can find that after adding the loop, Γk0 is increased by (K − k0 + 1)AzM
[
e
−αvk1−e
−αvk0
1−e−αzM
]
and
Γk1 is decreased by (K − k0 + 1)AzM
[
e
−αvk1−e
−αvk0
1−e−αzM
]
. Note that in the proof of Theorem 4, we
have shown that Γk(0;λ, ν) = f(vk)φu(k)zM for any k ∈ [K], which relates the dual constraint
Γk(0;λ, ν) with the virtual value φu(k) at k. With this idea, the process of adding a loop in λ is
equivalent to modifying the virtual value function. In addition, we can see that adding a loop does
not change the average virtual value, i.e. Γk0(0;λ
′, µ) + Γk1(0;λ
′, µ) = Γk0(0;λ, µ) + Γk1(0;λ, µ) =
f(vk0)φu(k0)zM + f(vk1)φu(k1)zM .
We call the particular process of modifying the virtual value function into a monotone increasing
function the ironing process. In the ironing process, we consider the convex hull of the revenue curve,
which is the cumulative function of the virtual value function, defined as
Fφ(k) =
∑
ℓ≤k
φu(ℓ).
Then, we take the derivative of the revenue curve as the ironed virtual value function. Formally,
we can define the ironing process as follows:
Definition 7 (Ironed virtual value for a single buyer). Given a virtual value function φu.
Let {[a1, b1], [a2, b2], . . . , [am, bm]} denote the minimum intervals that are not convex on the revenue
curve Fφ. The ironed virtual value function is defined as
φ˜u(k) =

∑bi
ℓ=ai
f(vℓ)φu(ℓ)
∑bi
ℓ=ai
f(vℓ)
, if k ∈ [ai, bi], for any i ∈ [m]
φu(ℓ), otherwise.
Then, we are ready to prove Theorem 5:
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). To prove Theorem 5, similar to the proof of Theorem 4, we need to
construct a set of feasible dual variables that makes the value of the dual program (9) equals to
the revenue of the optimal take-it-or-leave-it randomized price.
First, consider the λ and µ that we have used in the proof of Theorem 4: For any k, k′ ∈ [K],
we set µk = 0 and
λkk′ =
{∑
ℓ≥k f(vℓ)zM
1
u(vk)−u(vk−zM )
, if k′ = k − 1
0, otherwise.
We have already seen in the proof of Theorem 4 that
Γk(0;λ, µ) = Γk(zM ;λ, µ) = f(vk)φu(k)zM .
Then, we can apply the ironing process by adding loops in λ using (17) and (18). The loops are
added in a way such that
Γk(0; λ˜, µ) = f(vk)φ˜u(k)zM
for any k ∈ [K], where λ˜ is the λ after the ironing process. This can always be done by iteratively
adding a properly chosen loop between each adjacent pairs of types within the same ironing interval.
In the next step, we set ν˜k = max{0, f(vk)φ˜u(k)zM} and µ˜k = µk for any k ∈ [K]. We need to
verify that the set of dual variables (λ˜, µ˜, ν˜) is a set of feasible dual variables. First, by definition
of λ˜, we have
Γk(0; λ˜, µ˜) ≤ ν˜k.
for any k ∈ [K]. Second, by the property of adding a loop, we have
Γk(zM ; λ˜, µ˜) = Γk(0; λ˜, µ˜) ≤ ν˜k
Πk(zM ; λ˜, µ˜) = (1− e
−αzM )Γk(0; λ˜, µ˜) ≤ ν˜k
Therefore, (λ˜, µ˜, ν˜) is feasible. Finally, under this choice of the dual variables and the definition of
the ironed virtual value, we have∑
k
νk =
∑
k:φ˜u(k)>0
f(vk)φ˜u(k)zM .
Since adding a loop within an interval does not change the average virtual value of the interval, we
have ∑
k
νk =
∑
k:φ˜u(k)>0
f(vk)φ˜u(k)zM
=
∑
k:φ˜u(k)>0
f(vk)φu(k)zM
=
∑
k:φ˜u(k)>0
( ∑
k′≥k f(vk′)u(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
k′≥k+1 f(vk′)u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
)
zM
=
∑
k:φ˜u(k)>0
f(vk)zM ·
u(vk∗)
u(vk∗)− u(vk∗ − zM )
,
where k∗ = min{k : φ˜u(k) > 0}. This concludes the proof.
B Missing Proofs from Optimal Mechanism Design for Multiple Buyers
B.1 Proof of Theorem 6
First, we note that for each buyer i ∈ [n] and k ≥ k∗, the probability qi(k) that she pays zM can
be alternatively defined using the following recursive relationship
qi(k) =
1
1− xi(k)
·
[
xi(k)u(vk)− Ui,k−1(vk)
−u(−zM )
]
,
where Ui,k(v) = xi(k)u(v) + (1− xi(k))qi(k)u(−zM ) is the utility for buyer i given she bids vk and
her true value is v.
We prove Theorem 6 by showing the following three lemmas:
Lemma 3. Consider n ≥ 2 buyers with exponential utility. With Assumption (A1), the loser-pay
auction is individually rational, i.e. for any buyer i ∈ [n] and for any k ∈ [K], it holds that
Ui,k(vk) ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction for each buyer. Consider buyer i. For k < k∗, we have
that Ui,k(vk) = 0 by definition of the mechanism. For k = k
∗, we can see that
Ui,k∗(vk∗) = xi(k
∗)u(vk∗)− xi(k
∗)u(vk∗) = 0.
For the induction step, consider any k > k∗. Assume Ui,k−1(vk−1) ≥ 0 holds. We first note that
Ui,k(vk) = xi(k)u(vk) + (1− xi(k))qi(k)u(−zM )
= xi(k)u(vk)− [xi(k)u(vk)− Ui,k−1(vk)]
= Ui,k−1(vk).
Since Ui,k(v) is monotone non-decreasing in v for any i ∈ [n] and any k ∈ [K], we have Ui,k−1(vk) ≥
Ui,k−1(vk−1). Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, we have
Ui,k(vk) ≥ Ui,k−1(vk−1) ≥ 0.
The lemma follows by induction.
Lemma 4. Consider n ≥ 2 buyers with exponential utility. With Assumption (A1), the loser-pay
auction is feasible, i.e. for each buyer i ∈ [n] and for any k ∈ [K], it holds that qi(k) ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. We prove this by induction for each buyer. Consider buyer i. For k < k∗, by definition of
qi(k), we have qi(k) = 0. For k = k
∗, it is clear that qi(k
∗) ≥ 0. Also, by assumption (A1), we have
qi(k
∗) =
xi(k
∗)
1− xi(k∗)
·
u(vk∗)
−u(−zM )
≤
1− 1
n
f(vk∗)
1
n
f(vk∗)
·
eαvk∗ − 1
e−αzM − 1
< 1.
For the induction step, consider any k > k∗ and assume qi(k − 1) ∈ [0, 1]. First, to show that
qi(k) ≥ 0, note that
xi(k)u(vk)− Ui,k−1(vk) = xi(k)u(vk)− xi(k − 1)u(vk)− (1− xi(k − 1))qi(k − 1)u(−zM )
= (xi(k)− xi(k − 1)) u(vk) + (1− xi(k − 1)) qi(k − 1)(−u(−zM ))
≥ 0,
where the last inequality holds because xi(k) ≥ xi(k − 1) by definition, as well as the induction
hypothesis. For the upper bound, since by Lemma 3, we have Ui,k−1(vk) ≥ 0 for any k > k
∗,
therefore,
qi(k) <
xi(k)
1− xi(k)
·
u(vk)
−u(−zM )
≤
1− 1
n
f(vk)
1
n
f(vk)
·
eαvk − 1
e−αzM − 1
< 1.
The lemma follows by induction.
Lemma 5. Consider n ≥ 2 buyers with exponential utility. With Assumption (A1), the loser-pay
auction is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Proof. Fix any k ∈ [K]. We would like to show that for any k′ ∈ [K] and k′ 6= k, it holds that
Ui,k(vk) ≥ Ui,k′(vk). Before we prove the lemma, note that
∂Ui,k(v)
∂v
= αxi(k)e
αv .
Hence, by definition of xi(k), for any k > k
′, we have xi(k) ≥ xi(k
′). Therefore, for any k > k′, we
have
∂Ui,k(v)
∂v
≥
∂Ui,k′ (v)
∂v
.
To prove the lemma, first, we show that for any k′ < k, we have Ui,k(vk) ≥ Ui,k′(vk). To see
this, we claim that Ui,k(v) ≥ Ui,k′(v) for any v ≥ vk. We prove this by induction on k
′. The base
case (k′ = k − 1) holds since Ui,k(vk) = Ui,k−1(vk) by definition of qi(k). For the induction step,
consider any k′ < k−1 and assume Ui,k(v) ≥ Ui,k′+1(v) holds for any v ≥ vk. Since Ui,k′+1(vk′+1) =
Ui,k′(vk′+1) by definition of qi(k
′ + 1), we can find that Ui,k′+1(v) ≥ Ui,k′(v) for any v ≥ vk′+1.
Therefore, we have Ui,k(v) ≥ Ui,k′+1(v) ≥ Ui,k′(v) for any v ≥ vk. The claim follows by induction.
For k′ > k, we will use a similar argument, i.e. we claim that Ui,k(v) ≥ Ui,k′(v) for any v ≤ vk
and prove it by induction. The base case (k′ = k+ 1) holds because Ui,k(vk+1) = Ui,k+1(vk+1). For
the induction step, consider any k′ > k + 1 and assume Ui,k(v) ≥ Ui,k′−1(v) holds for any v ≤ vk.
Since Ui,k′−1(vk′) = Ui,k′(vk′), we have Ui,k′−1(v) ≥ Ui,k′(v) for any v ≤ vk′ . Therefore, we have
Ui,k(v) ≥ Ui,k′−1(v) ≥ Ui,k′(v) for any v ≤ vk. The claim follows by induction. This completes the
proof of the lemma.
B.2 Duality Theory for Optimal Mechanism
Lemma 6. In the dual program (12), both Γi,k(z;λ, µ) and Πi,k(z;λ, µ) are either increasing or
strongly convex in z for any i ∈ [n] and for z ≥ 0.
Proof. To show the lemma, we can simply rewrite Γi,k(z;λ, µ) as
Γi,k(z;λ, µ) = f(vk)z + βBi,ke
−αz − βAi,k, (19)
where
Ai,k =
∑
k′
(λi,k,k′ − λi,k′,k) + µi,k
Bi,k =
∑
k′
(λi,k,k′e
αvk − λi,k′,ke
αvk′ ) + µi,ke
αvk .
We can find that if Bi,k > 0, then Γi,k(z;λ, µ) is strongly convex in z whereas if Bi,k ≤ 0, then
Γi,k(z;λ, µ) is monotone increasing in z. Similarly, for Πi,k(z;λ, µ), we have
Πi,k(z;λ, µ) = f(vk)z + βAi,ke
−αz − βAi,k. (20)
Also, we can find that if Ai,k > 0, then Πi,k(z;λ, µ) is strongly convex in z whereas if Ai,k ≤ 0,
then Πi,k(z;λ, µ) is monotone increasing in z.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7, with regularity condition). To prove the theorem, we construct a set of
feasible dual variables and show that it makes the objective of the dual program (12) equal to the
revenue of the proposed mechanism.
For each buyer i ∈ [n] and any k, k′ ∈ [K], we set µi,k = 0 and
λi,k,k′ =
{∑
ℓ≥k f(vℓ)zM
eαvk
u(vk)−u(vk−zM )
, if k′ = k − 1
0, otherwise.
Also, for each buyer i ∈ [n] and any k ∈ [K]n, we set νi,k = 0 and
γk = max
i∈[n]
{0, f(k)Φu(ki)zM} .
We first verify that this choice of values for the dual variables is feasible for the dual program
(12). By Lemma 6, it suffices to check whether f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ, µ) ≤ γk, f(k−i)Γi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ γk,
and f(k−i)Πi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) ≤ 0. First, we have
f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ, µ) = f(k−i) [λi,ki,ki−1u(vki)− λi,ki+1,kiu(vki+1)]
= f(k−i)
[∑
ℓ≥ki
f(vℓ)zMe
αvkiu(vki)
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki+1
f(vℓ)zMe
αvki+1u(vki+1)
u(vki+1)− u(vki+1 − zM )
]
= f(k)Φu(ki)zM ≤ γk
and
f(k−i)Πi,ki(zM ;λ, µ)
= f(k−i) [f(vki)zM + (λi,ki,ki−1 − λi,ki+1,ki)u(−zM )]
= f(k−i)
[
f(vki) +
( ∑
ℓ≥ki
f(vℓ)e
αvki
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki+1
f(vℓ)e
αvki+1
u(vki+1)− u(vki+1 − zM )
)
u(−zM )
]
zM
= f(k−i)
[
f(vki) +
(∑
ℓ≥ki
f(vℓ)e
αvki
eαvki (1− e−αzM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki+1
f(vℓ)e
αvki+1
eαvki+1(1− e−αzM )
)
(e−αzM − 1)
]
zM
= 0.
For Γi,ki(zM ;λ, µ), we note that
f(vk)Φu(k)zM =
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
eαvku(vk)
u(vk)− u(vk − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
eαvk+1u(vk+1)
u(vk+1)− u(vk+1 − zM )
=
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
eαvk − 1
1− e−αzM
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
eαvk+1 − 1
1− e−αzM
= −
f(vk)
1− e−αzM
+
∑
ℓ≥k
f(vℓ)zM
eαvk
1− e−αzM
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1
f(vℓ)zM
eαvk+1
1− e−αzM
.
Then, we have
f(k−i)Γi,ki(zM ;λ, µ)
= f(k−i) [f(vki)zM + λi,ki,ki−1u(vki − zM )− λi,ki+1,kiu(vki+1 − zM )]
= f(k−i)
[
f(vki) +
∑
ℓ≥ki
f(vℓ)e
αvkiu(vki − zM )
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1 f(vℓ)e
αvki+1u(vki+1 − zM )
u(vki+1)− u(vki+1 − zM )
]
zM
= f(k−i)
[
f(vki) +
∑
ℓ≥ki
f(vℓ)e
αvki (eα(vki−zM ) − 1)
eαvki (1− e−αzM )
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1 f(vℓ)e
αvki+1(eα(vki+1−zM ) − 1)
eαvki+1(1− e−αzM )
]
zM
= f(k−i)
[
f(vki)
−e−αzM
1− e−αzM
+
∑
ℓ≥ki
f(vℓ)e
α(vki−zM )
1− e−αzM
−
∑
ℓ≥k+1 f(vℓ)e
α(vki+1−zM )
1− e−αzM
]
zM
= f(k)Φu(ki)zMe
−αzM ≤ γk.
For the next step, we show that under this choice of dual variables, the dual objective equals
the revenue of the mechanism. The revenue of the mechanism is the sum of the payments from all
buyers. Consider buyer i. The expected payment by buyer i can be written as∑
ki≥k∗
f(vki)(1− xi(ki))qi(ki)zM
=
∑
ki≥k∗
ki∑
k=k∗
f(vki)
[
[xi(k)− xi(k − 1)]u(vk)
−u(−zM )
]
zM
=
∑
ki≥k∗
∑
k≥ki
f(vk)
xi(ki)u(vki)
−u(zM )
−
∑
k≥ki+1
f(vk)
xi(ki)u(vki+1)
−u(zM )
 zM , (21)
where in the last equality we change the order of summation.
Further, we note that
∑
k∈[K]n
γk
[
1
{
vki ≥ vki′ ,∀i
′ 6= i
}∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
vki = vki′
}] = ∑
ki≥k∗
∑
k−i∈[K]n−1
γk
[
1
{
vki ≥ vki′ ,∀i
′ 6= i
}∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
vki = vki′
}]
=
∑
ki≥k∗
∑
k−i∈[K]n−1
f(ki,k−i)Φu(ki)zM
[
1
{
vki ≥ vki′ ,∀i
′ 6= i
}∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
vki = vki′
}]
=
∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)f(vki)Φu(ki)zM .
Then, by definition of Φu(ki), we have
∑
k∈[K]n
γk
[
1
{
vki ≥ vki′ ,∀i
′ 6= i
}∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
vki = vki′
}] = ∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)f(vki)Φu(ki)zM
=
∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)
∑
k′i≥ki
f(vk′i) ·
eαvkiu(vki)
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
−
∑
k′i≥ki+1
f(vk′i) ·
eαvki+1u(vki+1)
u(vki+1)− u(vki+1 − zM )
 zM
=
∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)
∑
k′i≥ki
f(vk′i) ·
u(vki)
−u(−zM )
−
∑
k′i≥ki+1
f(vk′i) ·
u(vki+1)
−u(−zM )
 zM , (22)
where in the last equality we use the fact that u(v)−u(v−zM ) = βe
αv(1−e−αzM ) = −eαvu(−zM ).
We can find that (22) is exactly equal to (21). Hence,
∑
k∈[K]n
γk
[
1
{
vki ≥ vki′ ,∀i
′ 6= i
}∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
vki = vki′
}] = ∑
ki≥k∗
f(vki)(1− xi(ki))qi(ki)zM .
Combining these together, we can conclude that the dual objective
∑
k∈[K]n
γk =
∑
k∈[K]n
γk
∑
i∈[n]
1
{
vki ≥ vki′ ,∀i
′ 6= i
}∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
vki = vki′
}

=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
ki≥k∗
f(vki)(1− xi(ki))qi(ki)zM
is equal to the revenue of the mechanism. Therefore the mechanism is optimal.
B.3 Optimal Mechanism beyond Regularity Condition
In the multiple buyer scenario, we can repeat the ironing process that we have discussed in Sec-
tion A.3 with the new virtual value function defined in Section 5.2. We can iron the virtual value
function by first taking the convex hull of the revenue curve, defined as
FΦ(k) =
∑
ℓ≤k
Φu(ℓ).
Then, we take the derivative of the revenue curve as the ironed virtual value function. Formally,
we can define the ironing process for the multi-buyer case as:
Definition 8 (Ironed virtual value for multiple buyers). Given a virtual value function Φu.
Let {[a1, b1], [a2, b2], . . . , [aP , bP ]} denote the minimum intervals that are not convex on the revenue
curve FΦ. The ironed virtual value function is defined as
Φ˜u(k) =

∑bp
ℓ=ap
f(vℓ)Φu(ℓ)
∑bp
ℓ=ap
f(vℓ)
, if k ∈ [ap, bp], for any p ∈ [P ]
Φu(ℓ), otherwise.
Then, we show the optimality of the loser-pay auction without regularity condition.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7, without regularity condition). To prove the theorem, we will take the
similar modification to the dual variables as we have done in the proof of Theorem 5. We will show
that we can add loops to the dual variables assigned in Section B.2 to apply the ironing process.
First, consider the process of adding a loop to λ. Let λ′ coincides with λ except at ki and k
′
i for
some k′i < ki and some i ∈ [n]:
λ′i,ki,k′i
= λi,ki,k′i +
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvki
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
λ′i,k′i,ki
= λi,k′i,ki +
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
e
αvk′
i
u(vk′i)− u(vk′i − zM )
for some A > 0. First, we can find that
f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ
′, µ)
= f(k−i)
Γi,ki(0;λ, µ) +∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvkiu(vki)
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
e
αvk′
iu(vk′i)
u(vk′i)− u(vk′i − zM )

= f(k−i)
[
Γi,ki(0;λ, µ) + (K − ki + 1)AzM
eαvki − e
αvk′
i
1− e−αzM
]
> f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ, µ).
Similarly, we have
f(k−i)Γi,k′i(0;λ
′, µ)
= f(k−i)
Γi,k′i(0;λ, µ) +∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
e
αvk′
iu(vk′i)
u(vk′i)− u(vk′i − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvkiu(vki)
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )

= f(k−i)
[
Γi,k′i(0;λ, µ) + (K − ki + 1)AzM
e
αvk′
i − eαvki
1− e−αzM
]
< f(k−i)Γi,k′i(0;λ, µ).
We can see that after adding the loop, Γi,ki is increased by (K − ki + 1)AzM
e
αvki−e
αv
k′
i
1−e−αzM
and Γi,k′i
is decreased by (K − ki + 1)AzM
e
αvki−e
αv
k′
i
1−e−αzM
. Due to the connection of Γi,ki and the virtual value
function as we mentioned in Section B.2, adding the loop is equivalent to modifying the virtual value
function. In addition, we can find that adding the loop does not change the average virtual value of
ki and k
′
i, i.e. f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ
′, µ)+f(k−i)Γi,k′i(0;λ
′, µ) = f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ, µ)+f(k−i)Γi,k′i(0;λ, µ) =
f(k−i, ki)Φu(ki) + f(k−i, k
′
i)Φu(k
′
i). Then, we make the following claim:
Claim. Assume f(k−i)Γi,k(zM ;λ, µ) = f(k−i)Γi,k(0;λ, µ)e
−αzM and f(k−i)Πi,k(zM ;λ, µ) = 0 hold
for k = ki and k = k
′
i for some k
′
i < ki and some i ∈ [n]. Suppose λ
′ is formed by adding a loop
between ki and k
′
i in λ. Then, it holds that
f(k−i)Γi,k(zM ;λ
′, µ) = f(k−i)Γi,k(0;λ
′, µ)e−αzM
f(k−i)Πi,k(zM ;λ
′, µ) = 0
for k = ki and k = k
′
i.
To prove this claim, we first note that
f(k−i)Γi,ki(zM ;λ
′, µ)
= f(k−i)
Γi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) +∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvkiu(vki − zM )
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
e
αvk′
iu(vk′i − zM )
u(vk′i)− u(vk′i − zM )

= f(k−i)
Γi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) +∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvki (eαvki e−αzM − 1)
eαvki (1− e−αzM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
e
αvk′
i (e
αvk′
i e−αzM − 1)
e
αvk′
i (1− e−αzM )

= f(k−i)
Γi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) +∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvki e−αzM − e
αvk′
i e−αzM
1− e−αzM

= f(k−i)
[
Γi,ki(0;λ, µ)e
−αzM + (K − ki + 1)AzM
eαvki − e
αvk′
i
1− e−αzM
e−αzM
]
= f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ
′, µ)e−αzM
Using the similar derivation, we can also see that
f(k−i)Γi,k′
i
(zM ;λ
′, µ)
= f(k−i)
Γi,k′i(zM ;λ, µ) +∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
e
αvk′
iu(vk′i − zM )
u(vk′i)− u(vk′i − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvkiu(vki − zM )
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )

= f(k−i)
[
Γi,k′i(0;λ, µ)e
−αzM + (K − ki + 1)AzM
e
αvk′
i − eαvki
1− e−αzM
e−αzM
]
= f(k−i)Γi,k′
i
(0;λ′, µ)e−αzM
For f(k−i)Πi,k(zM ;λ
′, µ),
f(k−i)Πi,ki(zM ;λ
′, µ)
= f(k−i)
Πi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) +∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvkiu(−zM )
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
e
αvk′
iu(−zM )
u(vk′i)− u(vk′i − zM )

= f(k−i)
Πi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) +∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
eαvki (e−αzM − 1)
eαvki (1− e−αzM )
−
∑
ℓ≥ki
AzM
e
αvk′
i (e−αzM − 1)
e
αvk′
i (1− e−αzM )

= f(k−i)Πi,ki(zM ;λ, µ)
= 0
Similarly, we can conclude that f(k−i)Πi,k′i(zM ;λ
′, µ) = 0. This proves the claim.
For the main part of the proof of the theorem, we first consider the assignment of the dual
variables that we have used in Section B.2: For each buyer i ∈ [n] and any k, k′ ∈ [K], we set
µi,k = 0 and
λi,k,k′ =
{∑
ℓ≥k f(vℓ)zM
eαvk
u(vk)−u(vk−zM )
, if k′ = k − 1
0, otherwise.
From Section B.2, we showed that this choice of λ and µ has the following properties:
1. f(k−i)Γi,ki(0;λ, µ) = f(k)Φu(ki)zM for any buyer i ∈ [n] and ki ∈ [K].
2. f(k−i)Γi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) = f(k)Φu(ki)zMe
−αzM for any buyer i ∈ [n] and ki ∈ [K].
3. f(k−i)Πi,ki(zM ;λ, µ) = 0 for any buyer i ∈ [n] and ki ∈ [K].
Then, we apply the ironing process by adding loops in λ. The loops are added in a way such that
f(k−i)Γi,ki(0; λ˜, µ) = f(k)Φ˜u(ki)zM .
for any buyer i ∈ [n] and any k ∈ [K]n, where λ˜ is the λ after ironing. This can always be done by
iteratively adding a properly chosen loop between adjacent pairs of types within the same ironing
interval.
In the next step, for each buyer i ∈ [n] and any k ∈ [K]n, we set νi,k = 0 and
γk = max
i∈[n]
{0, f(k)Φ˜u(ki)zM}.
It is easy to see that the new assignment of the dual variables (λ˜, µ˜, ν˜, γ˜) is a feasible assignment
using the definition of λ and the claim that we have made above. Then, we note that
∑
k∈[K]n
γ˜k
1
{
Φ˜u(vki) ≥ Φ˜u(vki′ ),∀i
′ 6= i
}
∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
Φ˜u(vki) = Φ˜u(vki′ )
}

=
∑
ki≥k∗
∑
k−i∈[K]n−1
γ˜k
1
{
Φ˜u(vki) ≥ Φ˜u(vki′ ),∀i
′ 6= i
}
∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
Φ˜u(vki) = Φ˜u(vki′ )
}

=
∑
ki≥k∗
∑
k−i∈[K]n−1
f(ki,k−i)Φ˜u(ki)zM
1
{
Φ˜u(vki) ≥ Φ˜u(vki′ ),∀i
′ 6= i
}
∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
Φ˜u(vki) = Φ˜u(vki′ )
}

=
∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)f(vki)Φ˜u(ki)zM .
Then, by definition of Φ˜u(ki), we have
∑
k∈[K]n
γ˜k
1
{
Φ˜u(vki) ≥ Φ˜u(vki′ ),∀i
′ 6= i
}
∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
Φ˜u(vki) = Φ˜u(vki′ )
}

=
∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)f(vki)Φ˜u(ki)zM =
∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)f(vki)Φu(ki)zM (23)
=
∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)
∑
k′i≥ki
f(vk′i) ·
eαvkiu(vki)
u(vki)− u(vki − zM )
−
∑
k′i≥ki+1
f(vk′i) ·
eαvki+1u(vki+1)
u(vki+1)− u(vki+1 − zM )
 zM
=
∑
ki≥k∗
xi(ki)
∑
k′
i
≥ki
f(vk′i) ·
u(vki)
−u(−zM )
−
∑
k′
i
≥ki+1
f(vk′i) ·
u(vki+1)
−u(−zM )
 zM , (24)
where (23) is because adding loops within an interval do not change the average virtual value of
the interval. We can find that (24) exactly equals to (21). Therefore, we have
∑
ki≥k∗
f(vki)(1 − xi(ki))qi(ki)zM =
∑
k∈[K]n
γ˜k
1
{
Φ˜u(vki) ≥ Φ˜u(vki′ ),∀i
′ 6= i
}
∑
i′∈[n] 1
{
Φ˜u(vki) = Φ˜u(vki′ )
}
 = ∑
k∈[K]n
γ˜k,
i.e. the revenue of the loser-pay auction is equal to the dual objective under the dual variables
(λ˜, µ˜, ν˜, γ˜). Therefore, by strong duality, the mechanism is optimal.
C Sub-optimality for General Utility Functions
Consider the class of quadratic utility functions with the form u(x) = β[(x + L)2 − L2] for some
L > zM . Unlike exponential utility functions, for quadratic utility, the optimal mechanism can
contain more than 2 menu options. We provide an example to show the following theorem:
Theorem 8. Consider a single risk-loving buyer. There exists a convex utility function u, and a
distribution f over a set of possible values V such that the revenue maximizing randomized take-it-
or-leave-it price is not optimal.
Proof. Consider the utility function u(x) = (x + 1)2 − 1. Assume the buyer’s value is uniformly
distributed between {0, 0.1, 0.2 . . . , 0.9}. Also, assume P = {0, 1}. The revenue of the optimal take-
it-or-leave-it randomized pricing can be found by solving
max
v∈V
Pr[t ≥ v]u(v)
u(v)− u(v − zM )
≈ 0.3200.
where the optimal revenue is attained when offering the two-priced menu option (1, 0.5333, 0).
Then, consider the mechanism with the following two-priced menu options:(
1
1.96
, 0, 1
)
≈ (0.5102, 0, 1),
(
1,
1536
2695
, 0
)
≈ (1, 0.5699, 0)
For the first menu option, its utility curve is
U1(v) =
1
1.96
u(v) +
0.96
1.96
u(−1) =
1
1.96
(v + 1)2 − 1.
Therefore, for any buyer with v ≥ 0.4, she prefers this menu option to (0, 0, 0). Next, the utility
curve of the second menu option is
U2(v) =
1536
2695
u(v − 1) +
1159
2695
u(v) = v2 +
2318
2695
v −
1536
2695
.
If we compare U1(v) with U2(v), we can find that
U2(v)− U1(v) =
24
2695
(11v + 3)(5v − 3),
which means that for any buyer with v ≥ 0.6, she prefers the second menu option to the first one.
The revenue of this mechanism is therefore
0.96
1.96
· 0.2 +
1536
2695
· 0.4 ≈ 0.3259,
which is greater than the optimal take-it-or-leave-it randomized pricing.
